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Post-Lecture Discussion
SPEAKER: HONORABLE JOSEPH F. WETS, JR.
MODERATOR: JOSEPH P. BAUER
SPEECH: "ARE 'COURTS OBSOLETE?"
DATE: FEBRUARY 21, 1992
Professor Bauer. [Professor, Notre Dame Law School.]
Thank you, Judge Weis. We now have time for comments and
questions.
Participant: I wonder if you could give law students some guidance
as we try and embark in the profession. The way you portrayed
our system is that we don't really seek the truth as much as pro-
tect our clients. How are we as ethical professionals supposed to
balance that when we're geared and we're taught for three years
how to manipulate a system and to use formalistic evidentiary
rules for the sake of our clients and not for the sake of the truth?
And you as a judge, how do you think we fit into this? How
should we deal with that, what I consider a dilemma?
Judge Weis: I don't know that it's always a dilemma. Once in a
great while you will have to make a real choice. But most of the
time, the rules that you're asked to enforce can be advocated and
pushed by you without violating the search for truth, if you really
want it to work that way.
You have to make decisions, I think, as to whether what
you're trying to do is right or wrong. And often times it comes up
during a trial. I suppose the classic example is the trial lawyer who
is convinced that the witness is telling the truth and yet proceeds
to do everything in his power to impugn the credibility of that
witness so that the jury will be misled. I don't think a lawyer is
required to do that. I think in a situation like that the lawyer's
obligation to the cause of justice and to the court predominates
over his obligation to present his client's cause. I don't think that
a lawyer has to push his client's cause by any means fair or foul to
win. I'm afraid that that prevails to6 often today in the courtroom.
I think that you still have to retain your sense of right and wrong,
although your client is entitled to all the protections that the law
gives. And I guess the real example of this is in a criminal case
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where the law requires that the prosecution prove its case beyond
a reasonable doubt. Certainly the criminal lawyer has the right to
require the state to produce that evidence, but it does not require
the lawyer to present perjured evidence or to twist or distort evi-
dence on the prosecution's side.
I wish we had a little bit more of the teaching of what's right
and wrong in the law schools. We need it, rather than how to
manipulate the system, as you put it.
Participant: I didn't mean to put our professors on the spot.
Judge Weis: Well, I think lawyers understand, and I hope you know
the difference between right and wrong and what truth is and
what justice is.
Participant: Yes. You alluded to it yourself by saying that you think
some of it is being lost in the courtroom. That's the sense that I
got, that the whole litigation process is so result oriented, and
that's part of the tension of trying a case.
Judge Weis: Well, I'm afraid that does exist out there. I recall one
case in particular where two large, well-known, national firms
spent innumerable pages in their briefs and supplemental offer-
ings doing nothing but attacking each other personally and saying
nothing about the merits of the dispute, and left the judges with a
very poor taste in their mouths for those lawyers. There, they
thought, I guess, they could get an advantage for their clients, by
personal, snide, sarcastic remarks about the other side, and they
had just the opposite result.
It's disheartening for us to see lawyers who will slant and twist
the facts in their briefs. In some instances, I have picked up the
appellant's brief and read it and thought, how in the world could
the trial court have come to this result? And then I've picked up
the other side's brief and thought that this must have been tried
on a different day; it must have been in a different state; they
aren't the same case at all.
So my advice to my students in preparing a brief, in getting
the statement of facts together is to have it bear some resem-
blance to what happened. Even if you can't bend all the way to
give the other side the breaks they're entitled to, make it at least
reasonably the same type of case.
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Participant: Have you seen in operation the victim/offender recon-
ciliation programs that the local Mennonites here promoted; and
also in Pennsylvania they are very strong? That's for minor cases,
but have you seen the operations of that kind?
Judge Weis: We haven't had much of a sampling of those cases on
appeal as yet, no. But I think we'll be seeing more of them in the
future.
It points out something interesting, I think, that is often over-
looked. And that is, that there is this sense of retribution, the
feeling of revenge by the victim that has to be taken care of in
some way by the justice system. Because if the victims don't feel
they have been treated fairly or some punishment has been inflict-
ed on the perpetrator, they'll leave the court system and take
justice into their own hands, and we'd go back to the days of
vigilante justice. That's a consideration that we just can't overlook.
I think perhaps the opportunity for victims to make a statement
gives them a chance to blow off some steam and get their resent-
ment out in the public, and they'll feel better afterwards.
Professor Bauer: I wonder, Judge, just following up on the earlier
question. I mean, the fact of the matter is that the rules of evi-
dence are structured in such a way that not all of the evidence
which is possibly even relevant is introduced. There are other
values that are involved as well, whether it's in the criminal law
which restricts the admissibility of evidence which is improperly
seized or whether it's in a civil setting and privileges are being
invoked.
Doesn't one have to bear in mind that, while the trial is in
one sense a search for the truth, it's not completely a search for
the truth because there are other very important values which are
implicated as well?
Judge Weis: Very true. I couldn't improve on your comment there.
But I think that the remedy is obviously to look at whether our
rules to exclude that evidence are doing what we hoped they
would. We think they do. But you know, so many of our rules are
founded on the idea that jurors could neither read nor write 500
years ago. And yet, we follow the same procedures today that we
did in medieval times, in many instances.
I would think that, in addition to the judge taking a more
active part in the trial, the jury should as well. The whole genius
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of the jury is not to have twelve people sit there like dummies
and have people talk at them for days and weeks. In a complicat-
ed case where the jury has to. sit there for six months or a year, it
must be intolerable to be subjected to that. We could preserve the
idea of the jury as a community-representative body by giving it a
lot more freedom; let it appoint a secretary' to take notes; allow
the jury to have a little committee to suggest various avenues or
approaches to the judge, or to suggest that they've heard enough
of a certain kind of testimony and they want to move on to some-
thing else. Jurors should be treated as intelligent human beings, I
think. And that means a lot of revisions of technique.
Participant: I wonder with the litigation explosion if courts and
society aren't going to have to increasingly turn towards alternative
avenues of dispute resolution or whatever you want to call it? The
courts just empirically, even the federal courts or even Congress,
have started to turn in that direction, and obviously groups out-
side of the courts have turned in that direction.
What do you do about this?
Judge Weis: Well, I agree with that, and I support A.D.R. in its
various forms because the courts can't handle all of the cases
themselves.
Pennsylvania has had a compulsory arbitration system for
many years, and it now has limits of $20,000, so that every case
filed in the state court worth less than $20,000 must be arbitrated.
A party has the right to appeal from that decision to the court for
a trial before a jury if they choose, but most people do not. They
are willing to accept the result of the arbitration.
Along the idea of mediation and settlement, the study made
by the Rand Institute just two years ago, I thought was revealing
and rather startling. They found that most of the litigants, most of
the losing litigants, were more satisfied with the results of an arbi-
tration hearing before lawyers or a hearing before a judge or jury
than they were with settlement proceedings conducted by the
judge. They felt that they had an opportunity to be heard by
some impartial entity, whether by the board of arbitrators or the
court, and they were willing to take the lumps. But they objected
strenuously to being forced into a settlement they didn't want. It
was rather surprising because the judges as a whole, I think, had
always felt that litigants were satisfied if a compromise was reached
so they walked away with something rather than nothing or with a
[Vol. 67:1399
WEIS DISCUSSION
smaller amount than they might otherwise have been forced to
pay, but such is not the case.
Participant: If I could just ask one related question. This morning
Roger Fisher talked about disputes being, on the increase. I know
the Federal Court Study Commission did some work on that as to
some speculation about the causes of the so-called litigation crisis.
Could you discuss this?
Judge Weis: I just don't know exactly what the answer is. But wheth-
er it's fed by TV portrayals of trials and lawyers or whether it's fed
by advertising or media attention to cases where people hit the
jackpot, there does seem to be an increased reliance by people on
going to court if things don't work out properly for them.
We're a little dismayed, too, that any societal problem, in the
eyes of some people, can be solved by filing a lawsuit. Some of
these cases, outside of injury or damage cases, really have no good
solution.
Many of the employment discrimination cases, for example,
that come before us, alleging either race, sex, nationality, whatev-
er, really aren't based on that kind of discrimination. If you start
analyzing it, you'll find that the employer and the employees did-
n't get along. The employee felt that he or she was treated unfair-
ly, not necessarily because of the legal reason, but just generally.
Any individual, particularly those, for example, in middle manage-
ment, whose discharge from his or her company in the middle
fifties will feel they've been discriminated against, and they won't
recognize the fact that the recession caused the company to pull
back its plans, to cut its personnel and so forth. It's all a personal
slight imposed on that individual. And he or she thinks if they file
a lawsuit and get a verdict they will be vindicated.
Along that line, there was a civil rights case that was decided
not long ago where the employee was awarded a substantial sum
for being improperly discharged. But the added remedy that the
judge put on, at the request of the plaintiff, was that the employer
apologize in a local newspaper for four weeks. And that caused
the biggest furor in the whole case. It was not the amount of
money, but the fact that the employer was forced to apologize
that caused trouble. That remedy would seem to be a tradition of
a Japanese lawsuit. If a person is adjudged to have been at fault,
he makes a public apology, and that's considered more than am-
ple in many cases.
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Professor Fisher: [Roger Fisher, Williston Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School.]
I very much welcome and agree with most of your remarks.
The experience with mediation in Massachusetts, where students
mediate all the small claims cases in Cambridge, so forth, is that
the desire to be heard is greater. They get half an hour, an hour
with the mediators, four minutes with the judge on a small claims
case. Further, they succeed in settling about eighty percent of the
cases, and the compliance rate with mediated agreements is great-
er than with judicial awards. Because the judge will say to pay
$500, and the guy hasn't got it. The mediation will be: come shov-
el the snow every time it snows until you earn back this, and do
this, and paint the fence, and it will work it out. So that, in fact,
the compliance works very well.
But one point which I would fight is the notion that our law
works because people accept the courts, not because of the force
behind it. But every decision involving the government, there is
no force there, no superior force behind it. Every tax refund,
every constitutional case, every criminal acquittal, the decision
sticks because the government decides to go along with it, not
because there is no super sovereign to force them to. And in in-
ternational cases we are dealing with governments by in large. And
the potential chance they'll comply with the fair result, whether
arbitrated, mediated, or what, may be almost as good as is in the
United States if they're satisfied with the process and think it's
fair.
Judge Weis: Perhaps. But I think in this country and I suppose in
most western countries, if the government refused to go along
with a court's decision, it would, I think, face a great deal of dis-
approval from the citizenry. Now, I think that's what keeps govern-
ment honest.
I suppose a good example was the Nixon tapes case, where
the President theoretically could tell the Supreme Court to go
jump in the lake. But he chose not to do that because I think he
recognized that public opinion would be so strong that he just
had to go along with it. I think that if this had been an interna-
tional dispute, you might not have had as much popular disap-
proval of a government failing to abide by a decision.
Professor Fisher: It's a question of integrating the rules into the
local, legal perception.
[Vol. 67:13991404
Judge Weis: Yes, right.'
Professor Fisher: But there have been a dozen or more cases where
Congress refused to appropriate money to the court for judge-
ments under special circumstances.
Judge Weis: Well, yes, we've had a few historic cases such as when
Andrew Jackson refused to enforce John Marshall's order to let
the Indians stay in a certain territory. But I hope we're getting
farther and farther away from things like that.
Professor Fisher: Think of mandatory mediation before adjudication.
In California in marital cases, they say you must mediate before
you go to court. I would think that you could have mandatory
exposure. I'm struck by the number of people who never talk to
the other side at all. They figure it's a sign of weakness if they call
up the other side and say they want to discuss settlement. So the
case comes to the court, or even to the Court of Appeals some-
times, with no settlement discussion ever having taking place.
Judge Weis: Well, I think that's very important, and you're right
that a great many cases do settle out because the parties have a
chance to sit down and talk. We have found, though, that by the
time that the case gets to court, you need a little extra push to
dispose of it. And the strongest incentive to settlement has been a
trial date.
We engaged in a process of conciliation of litigated cases in
Pittsburgh beginning in the early sixties. A trial judge had decided
that, instead of sitting in his chambers daily in between cases, he
would begin to call cases in from the list and see if he could work
out a settlement. He had a fair amount of success. I said to him
one day, "I've watched your program. Why don't you wait until
the cases are scheduled for trial within the next few days and see
how effective your settlement process works?" And it was about
three or four times more effective because the lawyers knew they
either had to fish or cut bait-the decision had to be made now.
There was no hope of something happening in the next year that
would turn things in their favor, nothing was going to turn up as
new evidence between now- and next Thursday. Now you had to
make the decision and that settled the case. And that has proved
to be very effective.
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Professor Murphy: [Edward Murphy, Professor, Notre Dame Law
School.]
Judge, what extent do you think that the growth of impartial
dispute settlement mechanisms has resulted from a perception that
people do not think they can get justice from the official court
system? I'm thinking of what seems to be an accelerating fragmen-
tation in-the society where values are no longer shared and where,
therefore, one almost has to seek a smaller unit in order to find
an adjudicating body that might share the value that that person
has. This would be something that would seem to be ongoing in
our society as we become less in agreement as to what basic prin-
ciples of justice and public policy are.
Judge Weis: I don't detect that feeling as much as I do the fact
that there's so much delay in reaching cases, particularly in the
metropolitan areas, and litigation has become so expensive. So
that if you can find a way to resolve a matter more rapidly and
with less expense, compulsory arbitration, mediation, things of that
nature, all of them are more acceptable to people who have been
waiting years for a trial to come up:
I suppose there is some of that element, though, in our soci-
ety. Our societal values are certainly different now than they were
fifty years ago, but I think not as much as would give some validity
to your fears.
Participant: I know you mentioned the Japanese system. We're
lucky enough today to have a Japanese judge with us. From talk-
ing with him, I've seen the distaste the Japanese have for litiga-
tion.
How are we as lawyers to get our clients to focus in on the
interest and come to a resolution? And before going to litigation,
how did you do that?
Judge Weis: I wish I knew the answer to your question. It's just a
problem of human nature, I guess. Some people are going to
resent what they think is a wrong and use every means that they
think is legally available in society to get their vengeance. I sup-
pose our colleague from Japan could tell us maybe that the Japa-
nese are perhaps not as volatile about things like that as we are.
We're a pretty wild country, you know. The days of the wild west
are only a hundred years ago. We are a melting pot of various
societies. We like to express our feelings. We like to pop off. And
(Vol. 67:1399
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I think that carries over into areas of personal slights and personal
injuries too. We really want to get. in there and fight. That just
seems to be our nature.
I suppose we can look to the English people maybe, that they
have calmed down a bit over the past couple hundred years. I
don't think they are as wild as they were back in the days of the
Elizabethans when they would hang a person, then split him up
one side, and chop his head off, put it on a pike, and parade
around with it. Now if we're going to kill somebody, we do it
rapidly and get it out of the way.
But that whole area of inflicting pain and torture on an indi-
vidual is a reflection of that same vengeance that I hope that
we're beginning to subdue a little bit in today's society. Maybe I'm
just being fanciful. I don't know.
Professor Bauer: Well, Judge Weis, thank you very much for that
very provocative discussion.

